repo-cross-pollination
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes content from guidance files (e.g.,
AGENTS.md, manifests, CI configs) found in external repositories. This establishes an attack surface where a donor repository could contain malicious instructions designed to hijack the agent's task during the cross-pollination process.\n - Ingestion points: The
IntakeandResearchphases inSKILL.mdread arbitrary files from repositories provided in the arguments to the skill.\n - Boundary markers: The skill does not define specific delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings for the external data ingested during the inventory phase.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill and its orchestrator possess capabilities for file writing, package installation (via
bun,uv,npm, etc.), and Git commits across multiple repositories.\n - Sanitization: Mitigation is provided by specific instructions to "Adapt rather than copy," "Rewrite each transfer for the recipient's... voice," and "Classify each candidate exactly once," which forces a human-in-the-loop or cognitive analysis step rather than raw data interpolation.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill and its associated inventory script execute various system commands to analyze and modify repositories.\n
- Evidence:
scripts/inventory.tsusesexecFileSyncto rungitcommands andjust --summaryon files found within the repositories. The implementation phase inSKILL.mdinvolves running package managers (e.g.,bun add,uv add,go get) which execute code based on the inventory discovered in the donor repositories.\n - Analysis: The risk is controlled by path resolution and validation of Git roots, but the process inherently trusts the output of local CLI tools and the metadata found in repository manifests.
Audit Metadata