repo-fanout
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs shell command execution to interact with Git repositories and a custom orchestration tool.
- Evidence: Uses
git -C '<path>' rev-parseandgit -C '<root>' statusfor repository management and validation. - Evidence: Invokes the
ai-coordCLI tool for orchestration operations includingbundle start,wait, anddone. - Evidence: Instructs agents to run 'validation commands' discovered within repository configuration files such as
justfile,package.json,AGENTS.md, orCLAUDE.md. This executes commands defined by the content of the target repositories. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from external repositories and other skills to define its execution plan, creating a surface for injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads contents from target repositories (
AGENTS.md,CLAUDE.md,justfile,package.json), external skill definitions (SKILL.md), and a user-provided--repos-fileinput. - Boundary markers: The instructions include requirements for a 'strict read-only boundary' for discovery agents and an 'authority boundary' for implementation agents to restrict their capabilities.
- Capability inventory: Capabilities include file writes within a defined scope, execution of
gitandai-coordcommands, and running validation scripts found in the processed repositories. - Sanitization: The skill does not explicitly describe sanitization or validation of the extracted commands or instructions before they are executed or interpolated into sub-agent briefs.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill specifies a requirement for the
ai-coordCLI tool as a mandatory external dependency for its orchestration and delegation features.
Audit Metadata