repo-rename
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
subprocessmodule to run Git and GitHub CLI commands. - Evidence: In
scripts/repo-rename.py, therunfunction executes commands likegit status,git ls-files,gh repo view, andgh repo rename. These are used to validate the repository state and perform the actual rename operations. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill reads and modifies files within the repository and AI agent transcript directories, which represents a potential attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/repo-rename.pyreads content from files within the repository (usinggit ls-filesoros.walk) and from AI agent project stores (~/.claude/projects,~/.codex/sessions). - Boundary markers: None; the skill performs literal byte-string replacements on the ingested content without delimiters or safety warnings.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute
gitandghcommands, rename directories (os.rename), and write to files (Path.write_bytes). - Sanitization: Input for the new repository name is validated to prevent directory traversal (
/or.checks), and paths used for agent continuity are normalized using regex inclaude_project_name.
Audit Metadata