repo-rename
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/repo-rename.pyexecutes shell commands usingsubprocess.run()to interact with Git and the GitHub CLI (gh). It calls commands likegit rev-parse,git status, andgh repo rename. These are executed using argument lists, which prevents shell injection, and the target name is validated for directory separators and hidden prefixes.- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill accesses and modifies configuration and session files located in private application directories, specifically~/.claude/projects,~/.codex/sessions, and~/.codex/config.toml. While these operations are documented as necessary for maintaining AI agent continuity after a rename, they involve reading and writing to sensitive project metadata and transcript stores.- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill performs bulk literal byte replacements within repository files and agent configuration files based on the renaming plan. This constitutes a surface for processing potentially untrusted data that enters the agent's context through the file system. \n - Ingestion points: Files within the current repository and agent-specific configuration directories (
~/.claude/projects,~/.codex/sessions,~/.codex/config.toml). \n - Boundary markers: None; the script performs deterministic byte replacement without content sanitization beyond name validation. \n
- Capability inventory: File system read/write, directory manipulation, and external command execution via Git and GitHub CLI. \n
- Sanitization: The
new_nameparameter is validated to disallow directory separators (/) and leading dots (.), mitigating basic path traversal risks.
Audit Metadata