agents-introspection
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill includes a specific instruction to "skip the ai-coord gate," which is an attempt to override or bypass platform-level orchestration and safety controls for its operations.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is designed to access and read sensitive data from personal directories, specifically
~/.codexand~/.claude, which contain interaction history. The instructions grant the agent authority to read transcripts from any materially relevant local project without asking for user permission for each access. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands (
pwd -P) and bundled Python scripts viauv run(scripts/transcript-miner.pyandscripts/transcript-inspect.py) to search and digest local transcript files. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted historical data found in transcripts, creating a vulnerability surface where malicious instructions from previous sessions could influence the agent's current recommendations or actions.
- Ingestion points: Historical transcript JSONL files located in
~/.codex/sessions,~/.codex/archived_sessions, and~/.claude/projects/. - Boundary markers: The
transcript-inspect.pyscript uses per-line channel prefixes (e.g.,user:,assistant:) to delimit historical content in the generated report. - Capability inventory: The skill has authority to write modifications to
AGENTS.mdand local skill files, and executes shell scripts viauv runas documented inSKILL.mdandreferences/transcript-sources.md. - Sanitization: The skill implements robust regex-based redaction for emails, API keys, and blockchain addresses in
scripts/transcript_common.py, but it does not filter or sanitize executable instructions or prompt injection patterns found in the mined content.
Audit Metadata