paw-mkt-launch
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources, creating a potential attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Research Mode uses
agent-browserto fetch content from Product Hunt, competitor blogs, LinkedIn, X/Twitter, and Reddit (seereferences/launch-type-assessment.mdandreferences/shared-patterns.md). - Boundary markers: The
Reference Lookup ProtocolinSKILL.mdimplements basic scoping by only reading matched files, but no explicit delimiters or instructions are provided to the LLM to ignore potentially malicious content embedded in the fetched web data. - Capability inventory: The skill has access to
agent-browserfor network interactions and interactive browser sessions, as well as file-write capabilities for saving deliverables to the vendor-specific./.pawbytes/directory. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering for content retrieved via
agent-browserbefore it is processed by the agent. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the
agent-browsertool, which is downloaded from a trusted organization's repository (vercel-labs/agent-browser). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for executing shell commands via
npxandagent-browserfor research and setup tasks. These operations use well-known tools and follow standard integration patterns for research-oriented marketing agents.
Audit Metadata