paw-cra-design-brand

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from user briefs and project files which is then interpolated directly into prompts for AI generation and content for HTML rendering. A malicious brief could attempt to influence the generation logic or inject content into the rendered templates.
  • Ingestion points: SKILL.md (Step 1: Brief Intake) processes data from the user or campaign brief files.
  • Boundary markers: None identified; the skill does not appear to use delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the ingested data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands (curl), write files to the project directory, and render HTML via Puppeteer/Playwright.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of user-supplied text before interpolation into prompts or HTML was observed.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates HTML and CSS code at runtime based on brand guidelines and user briefs, which is subsequently executed in a browser environment (Puppeteer or Playwright) to render flyers.
  • Evidence: references/flyer-rendering.md details the architecture for building and rendering these dynamic templates.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches AI-generated assets from fal.ai's official API endpoints.
  • Evidence: references/generation-pipeline.md uses curl to interact with queue.fal.run to submit jobs and download the resulting image files.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes several CLI utilities to process assets and communicate with remote services, including curl, jq, potrace, vtracer, and ImageMagick (convert).
  • These operations are used for standard asset conversion (bitmap-to-vector) and API interaction.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 15, 2026, 05:40 PM