paw-cra-design-social
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes freeform user briefs in
references/01-brief-and-context.mdwhich are used to construct prompts for image generation models inreferences/02-production.md. - Ingestion points: The Brief Intake section in
references/01-brief-and-context.mdaccepts untrusted parameters such as platform, format, and content/copy. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded within the user-provided brief.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilize shell commands for network requests (via
curl), file system write access for saving assets and manifests (references/03-validation-and-export.md), and browser-based rendering via Puppeteer or Playwright (references/02-production.md). - Sanitization: Absent. The content from the user brief is interpolated into design prompts and template parameters without evidence of escaping or validation.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow utilizes shell commands including
curlandjqto interact with external APIs and process JSON responses during the production stage (references/02-production.md). - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill employs browser automation tools (Puppeteer or Playwright) to render HTML and CSS templates into visual assets, which involves executing code in a browser environment to generate images from dynamic content.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches generated image assets from the
fal.runAPI, which is a recognized external service for AI image generation. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Transmits prompt data and authorization headers to the
fal.aiAPI. This is the intended behavior for generating social media assets but involves sending brand and campaign context to an external provider.
Audit Metadata