paymob-integration
Audited by Socket on Nov 14, 2026
2 alerts found:
SecurityAnomalyThe payment-integration purpose and most data flows are coherent, with strong HMAC, secret-handling, and live-action safeguards. Risk is elevated by the unverified executable diagnostic ZIP, mutable third-party Pixel script, and explicit concealment of AI authorship. These are concerning but do not establish confirmed malware or credential theft.
This is readable payment-integration code, not apparent malware. The principal security concern is that merchant_order_id is used after HMAC verification despite not being included in the signed fields, creating a potential payment-to-order misattribution risk if the persistence adapter trusts it; associate payments using authenticated identifiers or validate the mapping server-side. The configured Paymob destination is accept[.]paymob[.]com, and the code uses PAYMOB_SECRET_KEY and PAYMOB_HMAC_SECRET; severity is medium pending review of the persistence adapter.