skills/payram/payram-mcp/payram-setup/Gen Agent Trust Hub

payram-setup

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent or user to download and execute a shell script directly from the vendor's website.
  • Evidence: bash <(curl -fsSL https://payram.com/setup_payram.sh) --testnet in SKILL.md.
  • Context: This is a vendor-owned resource (payram.com) used for the primary purpose of the skill (installation).
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the execution of several system-level commands to configure the host environment and verify deployment.
  • Evidence: Use of docker port to verify network bindings and health checks.
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill commands require elevated permissions to modify the system's security posture and install software.
  • Evidence: Execution of sudo ufw to modify firewall rules and the requirement to SSH as a root or sudo user.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines an interface for MCP tools that process user-supplied data which could be used to inject malicious instructions if not properly handled.
  • Ingestion points: Parameters in the payram_setup_plan tool call within SKILL.md (e.g., domain, integration type).
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded content are provided in the documentation.
  • Capability inventory: Access to system shell, network utilities, and sensitive file system paths (e.g., ~/.payraminfo/aes/).
  • Sanitization: The skill does not describe any sanitization or validation logic for the external input data it processes.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://payram.com/setup_payram.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Oct 14, 2026, 12:21 PM