msg
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes an ingestion point for external data via the
msg inboxcommand, making the agent susceptible to instructions embedded in messages from other sessions. - Ingestion points: The
msg inboxcommand described inSKILL.mdreads messages from other agents into the current session context. - Boundary markers: There are no instructions for the agent to use delimiters or to treat incoming message content as purely passive data, which could lead the agent to execute instructions found in messages.
- Capability inventory: The agent has shell access to execute the
msgCLI and potentially other system tools, providing a vector for injected commands to take action. - Sanitization: The documentation does not specify any sanitization, filtering, or validation processes for the content of received messages.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
msg sendandmsg replycommands facilitate the movement of information between different agent sessions. While intended for coordination, this mechanism could be misused to exfiltrate sensitive data, such as environment variables or private file contents, by sending them to an external or attacker-controlled agent session.
Audit Metadata