requesting-code-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
code-reviewer.mdtemplate utilizes shell commands that incorporate variables through string interpolation. Specifically, the commandsgit diff --stat {BASE_SHA}..{HEAD_SHA}andgit diff {BASE_SHA}..{HEAD_SHA}directly embed the{BASE_SHA}and{HEAD_SHA}placeholders into the shell. This pattern presents a command injection risk if these variables are populated with malicious shell metacharacters, potentially allowing arbitrary code execution in the agent's environment. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting untrusted external data that is then processed by a subagent.
- Ingestion points: Data from
{WHAT_WAS_IMPLEMENTED},{PLAN_OR_REQUIREMENTS}, and{DESCRIPTION}is directly interpolated into the subagent's instructions withincode-reviewer.md. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or boundary markers are used to isolate the provided requirements or descriptions from the subagent's system instructions, which could allow malicious content in those fields to influence the reviewer's behavior.
- Capability inventory: The subagent has the capability to execute shell commands via the
gittool and provides an assessment that impacts the developer's decision to merge code. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or sanitization for the placeholder values before they are integrated into the prompt.
Audit Metadata