specifying-gates
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from task descriptions and external files which could be manipulated to influence agent behavior.\n
- Ingestion points: The skill uses
TaskGetto retrieve task descriptions andjson:metadatablocks, and may also read frominstances/<tag>/seed-briefing.mdas specified in the SKILL.md file.\n - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters defined to distinguish between instructional logic and the content being read from task metadata or briefing files, potentially allowing embedded instructions to be processed as valid configuration.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
TaskUpdateto write back modified metadata (including averifyCommandfield intended for later execution by theexecuting-plansskill) andAskUserQuestionto facilitate user interaction.\n - Sanitization: The instructions do not mandate sanitization or validation of external data before it is interpolated into task metadata or shown to the user.
Audit Metadata