ci-pipeline-profiler
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes a Python helper script (
scripts/profile_pipeline.py) to execute theglabCLI for GitLab API interactions. These commands are executed as lists usingsubprocess.run(), preventing shell injection. The script also runs itself underpython3for various analysis stages. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes job trace logs fetched from an external source (GitLab CI), which introduces a surface for indirect prompt injection if an attacker can control job output to manipulate the agent's interpretation.
- Ingestion points: Trace logs are fetched via
glab apiin thecmd_tracefunction and then read by thesectionsandsignalscommands inscripts/profile_pipeline.py. - Boundary markers: The skill relies on a predefined flow and report template but does not explicitly implement delimiters or safety warnings to ignore instructions embedded within the processed logs.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to read local project files, including
.gitlab-ci.yml,Makefile, andDockerfile. It produces a markdown report but does not have the capability to write to the filesystem or execute arbitrary external code based on log content. - Sanitization: The
signalscommand uses specific regular expressions to extract metrics (e.g.,go: downloading,sleep,buildxsteps), which serves as a structured filter that reduces the likelihood of raw malicious text being interpreted as instructions by the model.
Audit Metadata