cluster-topo-viz

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 16, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill provides explicit instructions to locate and read sensitive Kubernetes configuration files (kubeconfigs) in system-protected directories such as /etc/kubernetes and /root using find commands.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The documentation suggests using sshpass with plain-text passwords provided by the user, which is an insecure practice that can expose credentials in process lists, logs, or command history.
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The collection playbooks and scripts consistently utilize root access via SSH to execute remote commands and probe hardware, promoting a high-privilege operating model.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a workflow to perform wide-scale command execution on remote nodes via SSH and kubectl to retrieve hardware and fabric topology information.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests raw data from external tool outputs (such as kubectl, nvidia-smi, and iblinkinfo) which could contain malicious instructions if the cluster environment is untrusted.
  • Ingestion points: scripts/collect.sh (tool outputs from remote worker nodes).
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the script parses raw command output directly into a JSON data contract.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to ssh, kubectl, and local filesystem operations.
  • Sanitization: Absent; the collected data is normalized into a JSON structure but not filtered or sanitized for potential prompt injection markers.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 16, 2026, 10:43 AM