cluster-topo-viz
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill provides explicit instructions to locate and read sensitive Kubernetes configuration files (kubeconfigs) in system-protected directories such as
/etc/kubernetesand/rootusingfindcommands. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The documentation suggests using
sshpasswith plain-text passwords provided by the user, which is an insecure practice that can expose credentials in process lists, logs, or command history. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The collection playbooks and scripts consistently utilize
rootaccess via SSH to execute remote commands and probe hardware, promoting a high-privilege operating model. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a workflow to perform wide-scale command execution on remote nodes via SSH and
kubectlto retrieve hardware and fabric topology information. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests raw data from external tool outputs (such as
kubectl,nvidia-smi, andiblinkinfo) which could contain malicious instructions if the cluster environment is untrusted. - Ingestion points:
scripts/collect.sh(tool outputs from remote worker nodes). - Boundary markers: Absent; the script parses raw command output directly into a JSON data contract.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
ssh,kubectl, and local filesystem operations. - Sanitization: Absent; the collected data is normalized into a JSON structure but not filtered or sanitized for potential prompt injection markers.
Audit Metadata