multi-arch-harbor-push
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill requires the use of
sudofor all container-related operations including login, image building, pushing, and manifest management. This grants the agent root-level execution capabilities on the host system. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple shell commands via
nerdctlto perform builds and network operations against a container registry. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest untrusted data which is then interpolated into shell commands.
- Ingestion points: Reads parameters such as
IMAGE_NAME,IMAGE_TAG, andBUILD_ARGSfrom.envfiles,Makefiles, or direct user input (Section 1 - Confirm Parameters).
- Boundary markers: No boundary markers or specific instructions are provided to the agent to treat these inputs as data rather than potential command fragments.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses these parameters in
sudo nerdctl build,sudo nerdctl push, andsudo nerdctl manifestcommands across multiple sections (Sections 2, 3, 4, and 5). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, escaping, or sanitization before these variables are passed to the shell, creating a risk of command injection if an attacker can influence the environment files or user-provided parameters.
Audit Metadata