multi-arch-harbor-push

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 16, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill requires the use of sudo for all container-related operations including login, image building, pushing, and manifest management. This grants the agent root-level execution capabilities on the host system.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple shell commands via nerdctl to perform builds and network operations against a container registry.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest untrusted data which is then interpolated into shell commands.
  • Ingestion points: Reads parameters such as IMAGE_NAME, IMAGE_TAG, and BUILD_ARGS from .env files, Makefiles, or direct user input (Section 1
  • Confirm Parameters).
  • Boundary markers: No boundary markers or specific instructions are provided to the agent to treat these inputs as data rather than potential command fragments.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses these parameters in sudo nerdctl build, sudo nerdctl push, and sudo nerdctl manifest commands across multiple sections (Sections 2, 3, 4, and 5).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, escaping, or sanitization before these variables are passed to the shell, creating a risk of command injection if an attacker can influence the environment files or user-provided parameters.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 16, 2026, 10:43 AM