coauthor-brief
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it interpolates unvetted data from the repository into generated Markdown reports.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads external data from
git log(commit messages),git diff(code changes),quality_reports/plans/*.md,quality_reports/session_logs/*.md, andconfidential-data.md(metadata/rules file). - Boundary markers: The Phase 2 template does not utilize delimiters or specific boundary markers to isolate interpolated content from the rest of the instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the
Writetool (to create handoff files) and theBashtool (used for information gathering). - Sanitization: The instructions do not mandate sanitization or filtering of the gathered content, meaning malicious instructions embedded in a commit message or a plan file could influence subsequent agents reading the brief.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to perform discovery and data collection within the repository. - Evidence: Subprocess calls include
git log,git diff,git branch, andls -t. These commands are standard for the skill's stated purpose of summarizing project changes and are limited to read-only discovery operations.
Audit Metadata