coauthor-brief

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 5, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it interpolates unvetted data from the repository into generated Markdown reports.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads external data from git log (commit messages), git diff (code changes), quality_reports/plans/*.md, quality_reports/session_logs/*.md, and confidential-data.md (metadata/rules file).
  • Boundary markers: The Phase 2 template does not utilize delimiters or specific boundary markers to isolate interpolated content from the rest of the instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the Write tool (to create handoff files) and the Bash tool (used for information gathering).
  • Sanitization: The instructions do not mandate sanitization or filtering of the gathered content, meaning malicious instructions embedded in a commit message or a plan file could influence subsequent agents reading the brief.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the Bash tool to perform discovery and data collection within the repository.
  • Evidence: Subprocess calls include git log, git diff, git branch, and ls -t. These commands are standard for the skill's stated purpose of summarizing project changes and are limited to read-only discovery operations.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 5, 2026, 06:31 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — coauthor-brief