respond-to-eval
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to use the
Bashtool to execute shell commands (pdftotextandpandoc) using variables derived from user input ($0). While the examples provide quoting, passing user-supplied file paths to a shell environment carries inherent risks. - Evidence:
TMP=$(mktemp -t evals).txt && pdftotext "$0" "$TMP"(SKILL.md). - Evidence:
TMP=$(mktemp -t evals).txt && pandoc "$0" -t plain -o "$TMP"(SKILL.md). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process free-text student evaluations, which are untrusted external data sources. This content could contain malicious instructions intended to manipulate the agent's analysis or the resulting teaching improvement plan.
- Ingestion points: The primary input (
$0) contains raw student comments (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit requirements for using delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings when presenting the evaluation content to the model for clustering and classification.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
Read,Write, andBashtools to process the data and save the final report (SKILL.md). - Sanitization: The skill mentions anonymizing quotes by stripping identifying details, but does not provide a mechanism for sanitizing or validating the content against prompt injection attempts designed to influence the teaching plan recommendations.
Audit Metadata