respond-to-referees
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
Bashto execute file conversion tools likepdftotextandpandoc. It provides command templates that interpolate user-supplied file paths (e.g.,pdftotext "FILE" "$TMP"). If the agent executes these via a shell without rigorous sanitization of the input paths, a maliciously crafted filename (e.g., containing backticks or semicolons) could lead to arbitrary command execution. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources (referee reports and manuscripts) and grants the agent capabilities like
Bash,Write, andTask. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where instructions hidden within the academic documents could influence the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points: Path parameters
$0(referee report) and$1(revised manuscript) inSKILL.mdused as input for parsing. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define explicit boundary markers (like XML tags) or system-level warnings to ignore instructions found within the input files.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows use of
Read,Write,Edit,Grep,Glob,Bash, andTask(used to spawn aclaim-verifiersubagent). - Sanitization: The skill recommends quoting file paths in shell commands to prevent simple path injection, but it does not sanitize or filter the content of the documents being processed.
Audit Metadata