respond-to-referees
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process external referee reports and manuscripts. This introduces a surface where malicious instructions embedded in those documents could attempt to influence the agent's behavior during the response generation phase.
- Ingestion points: Paths provided via
$0(referee report) and$1(revised manuscript) are read and processed inSKILL.mdStep 1 and Step 2. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of clear delimiters or explicit instructions for the agent to ignore prompt injection attempts within the provided files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to powerful tools including
Write,Edit, andBash, which increases the potential impact of a successful injection. - Sanitization: While files are converted to plain text, there is no evidence of specific sanitization or filtering to remove potential instruction-like content from the text.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to perform file format conversions using system utilities. - Evidence: Found in Step 0 of
SKILL.md, the skill executes shell commands likeTMP=$(mktemp --suffix=.txt) && pdftotext "FILE" "$TMP"andpandoc "FILE" -t plain -o "$TMP". - Mitigation: The instructions follow security best practices by using
mktempto generate non-predictable temporary file paths and double-quoting theFILEvariable to mitigate potential shell injection vulnerabilities arising from filenames containing spaces or special characters.
Audit Metadata