scaffold-exercises
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 3, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection due to its core workflow of reading and processing external, user-provided files.
- Ingestion points: Phase 0 involves reading source materials such as lecture files (
.tex,.qmd), research papers, and dataset headers to define learning objectives and notation. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define boundary markers or provide explicit guidelines for the agent to ignore instructions embedded within these source files.
- Capability inventory: The skill is granted
Read,Grep,Glob,Write, andBashpermissions, allowing it to interact with the file system and execute shell commands. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the external content before it is used to influence the generation of problems and solutions.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Phase 2 of the workflow requires the agent to execute AI-generated code snippets to verify their correctness.
- Evidence: The skill explicitly instructs: "Coding solutions must actually run; if Bash + R/Stata are available, execute the snippet and paste real output." This involves running dynamically generated code in a shell environment.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
Bashtool to execute statistical software commands (R or Stata). While intended for verification of exercises, this provides a mechanism for arbitrary command execution if the agent is manipulated by malicious input from the ingested source materials.
Audit Metadata