google-ads
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute
cat ~/.google-ads.yamlin the 'Setup Check' section ofSKILL.md. This command reads the full contents of the Google Ads configuration file, which contains sensitive information includingdeveloper_token,client_id,client_secret, andrefresh_token. Reading this file into the agent's context and output streams exposes these credentials to the conversation history and platform logs, significantly increasing the risk of credential theft. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data from external sources (Google Ads UI and API).
- Ingestion points: Data is pulled from the browser via
browser:snapshotand from the API viaga_service.search()inSKILL.mdandreferences/browser-workflows.md. - Boundary markers: The skill does not use delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the retrieved ad data (e.g., campaign names, keyword text).
- Capability inventory: The skill has capabilities for shell command execution, browser automation, and Python script execution for mutating account states (e.g., pausing campaigns).
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of validation or sanitization of the campaign names or keyword text before they are processed by the agent.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata