herdr-orchestration
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill handles 'delegation packets' which are untrusted data strings passed to worker agents, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: External data enters via the
<packet>argument inrtk herdr agent startcommands or via follow-up prompts inrtk herdr pane run(documented inSKILL.mdandreferences/plan-mode.md). - Boundary markers: The skill lacks technical boundary markers or sanitization logic for packet content, relying instead on high-level procedural instructions for the controller agent.
- Capability inventory: The worker agents (
claude,codex) have extensive capabilities, including filesystem access and command execution, which are invoked via thertkorchestration tool. - Sanitization: The instructions mandate manual verification steps, including reviewing diffs and re-running tests, to mitigate the risk of malicious worker output.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands to manage the orchestration environment, specifically using flags that disable safety prompts.
- Evidence: Instructions in
SKILL.mdmandate the use of--dangerously-skip-permissionsfor Claude and--yolofor Codex duringrtk herdr agent startto ensure workers run unattended without stalling on permission prompts. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions for installing worker integrations from well-known providers.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdincludes commands such asrtk herdr integration install claudeandrtk herdr integration install codexto set up worker agents.
Audit Metadata