skills/pedronauck/skills/sentry-cli/Gen Agent Trust Hub

sentry-cli

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions to download and execute an installation script from Sentry's official domain.
  • Evidence: curl https://cli.sentry.dev/install -fsS | bash in SKILL.md.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates the installation of the Sentry CLI via a global npm package installation.
  • Evidence: npm install -g sentry in SKILL.md.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the sentry command-line tool to interact with Sentry APIs for authentication, organization/project management, and issue analysis.
  • Evidence: Extensive use of sentry commands throughout SKILL.md (e.g., sentry auth, sentry project, sentry issue).
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by interpolating untrusted user inputs (like slugs and queries) into shell command arguments.
  • Ingestion points: User-provided values for <org-slug>, <project-slug>, <query>, and <issue-id> are passed to CLI commands in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. No specific delimiters or instructions to ignore malicious content within these inputs are provided.
  • Capability inventory: Commands allow reading/writing to Sentry projects, organizations, and authentication tokens via the network.
  • Sanitization: Absent. There is no mention of validating or escaping inputs before they are passed to the shell.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://cli.sentry.dev/install - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Sep 16, 2026, 11:03 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — sentry-cli