penpot-build-deck
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user data (the presentation brief) to generate content for slides, which introduces a potential vector for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The primary ingestion point is the user-provided 'brief' in Phase 0, which the agent analyzes to derive the outline, message, and tonal arc.
- Boundary markers: There are no explicit boundary markers or 'ignore' instructions wrapping the processed text before it is used to populate slide shapes.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive write capabilities to the Penpot environment, including board creation, text modification, layout manipulation, and external image uploads via
uploadMediaUrl. - Sanitization: No specific sanitization or escaping is performed on the text extracted from the brief before it is passed to
penpot.createTextcalls in thebuildSlide.jsscript. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the
execute_codetool to run its internal JavaScript scripts (scripts/*.js) for automating Penpot design tasks. - This behavior is consistent with the primary purpose of the skill and the operational requirements of the Penpot automation platform.
- The
applyDeckEffects.jsscript includes a security check to ensure that image uploads only usehttps://URLs, reducing the risk of SSRF or local file access through the upload tool.
Audit Metadata