penpot-router
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted design metadata from the Penpot workspace and interpolates it into prompts for downstream skills.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.md(Phase 0) andreferences/02-preflight-overview.mddefine logic to read layer names, page names, and token structures usingexecute_codediscovery calls. - Boundary markers: The skill does not define specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the ingested design data before constructing the handoff brief.
- Capability inventory: Uses the
execute_codetool for environmental discovery and session state management. - Sanitization: No evidence of escaping or filtering for layer names or token values that might contain malicious instructions.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill provides JavaScript templates to be executed via the
execute_codetool. - Evidence: Phase 0 discovery logic and breadcrumb recording involve generating and executing small code snippets to query the Penpot API.
Audit Metadata