srt
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes
ffmpegvia Node.jschild_process.execFilefor media probing and subtitle burn-in. Arguments are constructed using sanitized inputs and platform-specific path resolution to prevent shell injection. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Downloads media assets and project configuration files from the vendor's official domains (
perso.ai,portal-media.perso.ai) and GitHub repositories as part of its subtitle extraction and styling workflows. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Sends usage telemetry and media processing requests to the vendor's API. The skill includes explicit instructions and code safeguards to ensure that the
XP-API-KEYis handled securely and never passed as a command-line argument or revealed in chat logs. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect prompt injection surface exists as the skill processes untrusted text content from subtitle files (SRT) for translation.
- Ingestion points: Reads SRT content from local files or URLs during the translation phase described in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions explicitly define the scope of translation ("Translate only the text lines") and mandate the preservation of SRT structural elements.
- Capability inventory: Subprocess execution for
ffmpeg, local file system writes for SRT/MP4, and network operations to the vendor API. - Sanitization: The
lib/subtitle_style.mjsscript includes theassTextfunction which sanitizes input strings by stripping backslashes and braces to prevent Advanced Substation Alpha (ASS) override injection during the hardsubbing process.
Audit Metadata