crosspost

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill directs the agent to fetch instructions from https://postwire.io/SKILL.md using curl -fsSL and follow them to "add the MCP server". This pattern allows for the execution of configuration routines or commands from a remote source that are not part of the statically audited skill file.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs network operations to postwire.io to retrieve media URLs, verify account status, and download secondary instruction files for environment setup.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's setup process is vulnerable to indirect injection as it ingests and obeys instructions retrieved from an external server during runtime.
  • Ingestion points: Remote instruction file fetched from https://postwire.io/SKILL.md as described in SKILL.md (Step 0).
  • Boundary markers: None identified; the agent is instructed to read and follow the remote file directly.
  • Capability inventory: Subprocess execution via curl, potential file system modifications during MCP server setup, and social media posting capabilities.
  • Sanitization: No evidence of verification, integrity checking, or sanitization for the fetched remote instructions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 14, 2026, 04:03 PM