process-hunter
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides the agent with the ability to terminate any system process using the
terminate_process.pyscript, which utilizesos.kill()withSIGTERMandSIGKILL. While this is the intended function, the instructions inSKILL.mdencourage the agent to "bonk known bad creature automatic," potentially leading to the termination of critical development servers (e.g., Next.js, Webpack, Vite) without immediate user confirmation, resulting in data loss. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
AUTO_KILL_PATTERNSinscripts/hunt_processes.pyinclude a regex forclaude. If the agent's own process or related sidecar processes contain this string, the skill instructions may lead the agent to terminate its own execution environment. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill represents a surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data from the system's process list.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/hunt_processes.pyreads the output ofps -eo pid,pcpu,rss,comm,args, which contains arbitrary strings from command-line arguments of all running processes. - Boundary markers: None. The raw process names and commands are processed and eventually displayed in the "Victory Report" and "Impact Report."
- Capability inventory: The agent can terminate processes (
scripts/terminate_process.py) and write files to the temporary directory (scripts/measure_power.pywrites to/tmp/caveman_juice_memory.json). - Sanitization: The skill performs no sanitization or escaping of the process names/commands before including them in reports that the agent is instructed to read and show to the user.
Audit Metadata