latent-potential

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 5, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process large amounts of untrusted data from a target repository, including README files, documentation, and source code. There are no instructions for boundary markers or sanitization to prevent the agent from following malicious instructions embedded in these files.
  • Ingestion points: Phase 1 instructions involve reading the README, documentation, and the entire codebase.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not specify using delimiters or 'ignore' instructions for the ingested content.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands (git), write files, and potentially use web search tools.
  • Sanitization: Absent.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to generate and execute code at runtime to verify its assessment hypotheses.
  • Evidence: In Phase 3, the instructions state: "Build probe harnesses in your working area, never inside the target repo" and "If a winner's cheapest probe can run right now... run it during this pass."
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell commands to inspect the project environment and run existing test suites.
  • Evidence: Phase 1 uses git log --oneline --stat. Phase 3 mentions "running a bundled harness against fixtures."
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: While not directly malicious, the 'Ecosystem Watcher' lens encourages external web searches based on the project context, which can leak sensitive project details or metadata to external search engines.
  • Evidence: The Ecosystem lens instructions in Phase 2 note that the lens "is sharper with a web search for current context."
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 5, 2026, 03:07 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — latent-potential