create-worktree
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill utilizes external data as a source of executable instructions, creating an indirect prompt injection surface.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.mdidentifiesworktrees/worktree-modes.yamlandAGENTS.mdas sources of truth for startup, selection, and scaffolding instructions. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack delimiters or explicit warnings to treat the content of the repository files as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The agent is authorized to perform shell command execution for setup, startup, and readiness checks, and can perform network requests via
curlfor service verification. - Sanitization: Although the skill implements output sanitization (refusing to print secrets), it does not provide validation or sanitization for the commands retrieved from the configuration files before they are executed.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to execute shell commands specified within the workspace configuration.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to "Follow the selected mode entry... exactly... Run only its scaffolding/setup commands" and "Run every startup command for the selected mode." - Evidence: The skill uses
curl -fsSfor readiness verification, which can be used to interact with arbitrary endpoints specified in the configuration.
Audit Metadata