cv-customizer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data from Job Descriptions and CVs across multiple analysis phases, which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points:
JD_TEXT(collected via text, file, or WebFetch URL) andCV_TEXT(text or file) as defined inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill instructions do not implement explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded content when passing external text to the subagents (
cv-job-decoder,cv-progression). - Capability inventory: The workflow includes the ability to create and update Google Docs (
mcp__google-workspace__create_doc,mcp__google-workspace__batch_update_doc) and fetch content from the web usingWebFetch. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering applied to the input text before it is interpolated into analysis prompts.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation includes an installation command that references the author's GitHub repository (
github.com/peter-tu-zynkr/zynkr-skill-builder). This is identified as a vendor-owned resource.
Audit Metadata