seo-persona-builder
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads brand material from user-provided 'brand-material packs' and external Google Drive documents (brand culture, website content, industry background, etc.) as described in Step 1 of
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions to the agent to ignore embedded commands within the ingested brand material.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to the
google-workspaceMCP server, allowing it to search Drive, read file content, and write outputs to Drive subfolders. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the ingested document content is mentioned before it is processed by the agent.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation in
SKILL.mdincludes a command for the user to install the skill from an external repository. - Evidence:
npx skills add https://github.com/peter-tu-zynkr/zynkr-skill-builder --skill seo-persona-builder - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
google-workspaceMCP server to interact with the file system (Google Drive). - Evidence: Uses
search_drive_filesandget_drive_file_contentto access organizational data and writes confirmation packets back to Drive.
Audit Metadata