training-process-video
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes raw livestream transcript text as its primary data source. This untrusted content is passed to multiple sub-agents to generate recaps, Q&A entries, and lecture notes without explicit security boundaries or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
- Ingestion points: Transcript files are ingested in
SKILL.mdand forwarded to agents in Step 4. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the agent prompts when handling the transcript data.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute file system commands and interact with external APIs via Google Workspace and Kit MCP tools.
- Sanitization: No specific sanitization or filtering is performed on transcript content before it is processed by the AI sub-agents.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Shell commands are used for project file organization and archival tasks.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdandagents/training-doc-admin.mdusecp,mv, andmkdirto manage transcript files based on titles and dates, though renaming logic includes slugification as a basic mitigation. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill provides Python code snippets for the agent to execute at runtime for tasks not covered by existing tools.
- Evidence: Step 9.6 of
SKILL.mdincludes Python code for roster conversion (Excel to Google Sheets) and Google Drive shortcut creation, intended for execution by the agent. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill integrates with external platforms through MCP for legitimate synchronization.
- Evidence: Uses MCP tools for Google Workspace (Docs, Sheets, Drive) and Kit to sync processed content and subscriber data. These integrations target well-known services consistent with the skill's primary function.
Audit Metadata