zynkr-ops-weekly
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PERSISTENCE]: The skill is designed to run as a scheduled background process on a local machine using macOS
launchd. The installation instructions inreferences/scheduling.mdand the runner scriptscripts/run_ops_weekly.shdirect the user to install aLaunchAgentplist to maintain execution across sessions. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from Google Chat messages and processes that data to perform actions like writing to a Google Doc and sending emails.
- Ingestion points: Data enters via the
mcp__google-workspace__get_messagestool as documented inSKILL.mdand handled byscripts/parse_reports.py. - Boundary markers: While the skill uses marked blocks (
〔自動彙整 …〕) to isolate its output in the Google Doc, it lacks explicit prompt delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the ingested chat messages themselves. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities to write to documents (
batch_update_doc), post to chat (send_message), and send emails (send_gmail_message). - Sanitization:
scripts/parse_reports.pyprovides a layer of sanitization by using regular expressions to extract specific report fields before the data is processed by the AI agent. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The installation instructions in
SKILL.mdsuggest running annpxcommand to add the skill, which executes remote code from the author's repository.
Audit Metadata