kiro-specs
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes a bash script within its detection logic to verify the presence of workspace directories and specification files.
- Evidence: Found in
SKILL.md, the script uses standard commands likelsand file test operators (-d,-f) to check the.kiro/specs/path. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted user ideas and external research data which are then used to guide subsequent implementation tasks.
- Ingestion points: User-provided feature descriptions in
phase-1-requirements.mdand content retrieved via web searches or MCP tools during the research phase described inphase-2-design.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters or markers to isolate ingested data from agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to read/write files within the workspace (
.kiro/specs/) and implement code changes during the execution phase (phase-4-execute.md). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the data processed during the requirements and design phases.
Audit Metadata