fastapi-workflow
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a
PostToolUsehook designed to run themypystatic type checker after a Python file is edited. The hook executes the commandbash -c '... python -m mypy ... "$TOOL_INPUT_FILE_PATH" ...'. The use of$TOOL_INPUT_FILE_PATHwithin a shell-executed string, even though enclosed in double quotes, presents a theoretical surface for command injection if the environment variable contains malicious shell metacharacters and is not sanitized by the platform. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is subject to a surface for indirect prompt injection via the local project's file structure.
- Ingestion points: The skill processes file paths (specifically
$TOOL_INPUT_FILE_PATH) provided by the agent's internal tooling context after editing a file. - Boundary markers: The file path variable is enclosed in double quotes within the shell command string, providing minimal protection against adversarial shell payloads.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute shell commands using
bash -cand to run themypyPython module. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization, character escaping, or path validation is performed on the input variable before it is incorporated into the shell command.
Audit Metadata