frontend-app
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 11, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes PostToolUse hooks to automatically trigger the execution of local bash scripts (
ts-check.sh,auto-prettier.sh,console-log-check.sh) located in the hidden~/.claude/hooks/directory. These scripts are executed whenever files with.ts,.tsx,.js, or.jsxextensions are modified, enabling local command execution as a background side effect of agent edits.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill employs behavior-steering language ("CRITICAL PRINCIPLE", "NON-NEGOTIABLE", "MUST NEVER") to override the agent's default logic and mandate the use of documentation-fetching tools. Additionally, it introduces a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection by instructing the agent to "Follow fetched docs exactly" for code generation.\n - Ingestion points: Data returned from MCP tools such as
fetch_tailwind_docs,fetch_alpine_patterns,fetch_vite_config, andget_ecommerce_ui_pattern.\n - Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not define delimiters to isolate untrusted external documentation from the agent's instructions.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to modify local files and trigger shell commands via hooks and testing tools (e.g., Playwright).\n
- Sanitization: While the skill advises stripping
<script>tags from SVGs, it lacks automated sanitization for the textual content ingested from external documentation sources.
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