team-briefing
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection as it processes plan files from the project directory and user-supplied arguments without sufficient isolation.
- Ingestion points: Reads plan content from
docs/plans/*.mdand accepts input via$ARGUMENTSwhich are then interpolated into orchestrator and persona prompts. - Boundary markers: Lacks robust delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the
{plan_content}and{project_context}variables. - Capability inventory: The skill can launch subagents and execute shell commands via the
geminiCLI tool. - Sanitization: No input validation or sanitization is performed on the ingested content.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell commands for both environment inspection and task execution.
- Dynamic Context Injection: Uses the
!syntax inSKILL.mdto rungit,ls,head, andcatduring skill loading to extract current project context. - External Tooling: Provides an option to execute the
geminiCLI tool sequentially to process reviews for each persona. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: When the Gemini engine is selected, the skill transmits project context and plan content to external service endpoints via the
geminiCLI tool.
Audit Metadata