videoagent-director

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-originated creative briefs to generate prompts and parameters for media production tools, creating a vulnerability surface.
  • Ingestion points: User-provided video concepts, briefs, and image URLs are ingested by the creative director instructions in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the instructions do not implement delimiters or explicit warnings to ignore instructions embedded within the user's brief.
  • Capability inventory: The skill executes local shell commands via tools/director.js and performs network POST requests to external proxy endpoints.
  • Sanitization: No specific validation, escaping, or filtering logic is present in the director.js script to sanitize user-originated content before it is passed to tool arguments.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill interacts with remote services to manage the generation pipeline.
  • Findings: Fetches session tokens and generation results from vendor-managed proxies hosted on Vercel (such as pexo-video-deploy.vercel.app). These network operations are core to the skill's "API key-free" design and are documented in the README.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes a local utility script to handle shot execution.
  • Findings: The agent is instructed to invoke tools/director.js with structured CLI arguments for each shot. The script uses Node.js standard libraries to manage these operations safely within its defined scope.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 15, 2026, 01:14 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — videoagent-director