find-content-angles
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and analyze external content (blog posts, talk abstracts, etc.) provided by the user, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions embedded in the content could potentially override the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: User-provided content piece (Q&A step 1) and the local configuration file
~/.devadvokit.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not employ delimiters or specific instructions to ignore embedded commands within the analyzed material.
- Capability inventory: The skill instructions involve reading local files (
~/.devadvokit.mdand../../shared/ai-antipatterns.md). - Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of logic to filter or escape potential instructional patterns within the ingested content.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses a hidden configuration file located at
~/.devadvokit.md. While this is consistent with the tool's stated purpose of utilizing 'DevRel context', accessing hidden files in the user's home directory is a pattern associated with gathering local environment data. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill performs directory traversal to read
../../shared/ai-antipatterns.md, accessing a file located outside the immediate skill directory structure. The agent is further instructed to perform this check and any subsequent content rewriting 'silently', without informing the user.
Audit Metadata