barrage
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 31, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to download a script from https://raw.githubusercontent.com/codetesla51/barrage/main/install.sh and pipe it directly to bash, which executes code from a repository not associated with a trusted organization.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches installation scripts and Go packages from the codetesla51/barrage GitHub repository, which is external to the skill author (phenpen) and not a recognized trusted vendor.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the execution of multiple shell commands, including go build, go run, and the barrage CLI tool itself, which can pose a risk if the source repository is compromised.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from external HTTP endpoints, databases, and Redis instances, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection via the load testing results.
- Ingestion points: The http, db, and redis runners ingest data from target systems as defined in the barrage config files.
- Capability inventory: The skill executes shell commands using the barrage binary and Go compiler tools.
- Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions to use delimiters or ignore embedded prompts in the data being analyzed.
- Sanitization: The instructions do not specify any sanitization or filtering of the content retrieved from external sources during testing.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/codetesla51/barrage/main/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata