slide-skill

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 22, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes several Python and Node.js scripts that execute external system binaries to process presentation files and images.
  • Evidence:
  • container_tools/render_slides.py executes soffice (LibreOffice) to convert PPTX files to PDF and ODP.
  • container_tools/ensure_raster_image.py executes inkscape, magick/convert, gs (Ghostscript), heif-convert, and JxrDecApp to process various image formats.
  • container_tools/detect_font.py executes fc-list to query system fonts.
  • pptxgenjs_helpers/text.js executes fc-match via spawnSync to resolve font paths.
  • Mitigation: These scripts use list-based arguments for subprocess calls rather than shell strings, which significantly reduces the risk of command injection. The skill also explicitly requires defusedxml to mitigate XML-based attacks when parsing OOXML files.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process user-provided presentation files, which creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Presentation files are loaded and parsed in container_tools/render_slides.py and via the PresentationFile.import_pptx method described in artifact_tool/inspect.spec.md.
  • Boundary markers: No specific boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands were identified for the text content within processed slides.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute system commands (via the renderers), read/write to the local filesystem, and control a browser via agent-browser (as instructed in SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: While defusedxml provides protection against XML External Entity (XXE) attacks, the natural language content within the slides is not sanitized against adversarial instructions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 22, 2026, 12:04 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — slide-skill