pflow-skill-add
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 10, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
skill-add-finalize.shexecuteschmod +xon all files within ascripts/subdirectory of a target path provided by the agent. This behavior programmatically elevates file permissions for content generated by the AI. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
--nameargument inskill-add-finalize.shis used to construct a file system path (target="$SKILLS_DIR/$name") without validation. An attacker or a confused agent could provide a path containing directory traversal sequences (e.g.,../../) to modify permissions of files outside the intended directory scope. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection. In
skill-add-context.sh, the script reads and parses thedescriptionfield from everySKILL.mdfile in sibling directories and includes this data in the context for Step 1. Malicious instructions placed in the metadata of an existing skill could influence the agent's behavior during the scaffolding process. - Ingestion points: Reads
SKILL.mdfiles from sibling directories inscripts/skill-add-context.sh. - Boundary markers: None. The raw content of the description field is interpolated into the JSON output.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to write files to the filesystem (Step 3) and execute
chmod +x(Step 4) viaskill-add-finalize.sh. - Sanitization: The script uses a simple regex to extract the description and performs basic JSON escaping, but does not sanitize the content against natural language instructions.
Audit Metadata