pflow-task-plan
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The provided scripts
plan-context.shandplan-save.shboth contain logic to automatically load environment variables from a.envfile located at the project root. - Evidence: The
load_dotenvfunction in both bash scripts specifically targets$ROOT_DIR/.env, parses its content, and exports the key-value pairs to the environment. - Risk:
.envfiles are frequently used to store sensitive information such as API keys, database credentials, and private tokens. Reading this file at runtime exposes these secrets to the script's execution environment. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to process task information from an external
todo.mdfile (via themdtodotool), which presents a surface for indirect prompt injection. - Ingestion points:
plan-context.shcaptures output frommdtodo currentandmdtodo list(specifically task titles and statuses) to populate the agent's context for thecurrent_task. - Boundary markers: The instructions in
SKILL.mddo not provide the agent with specific delimiters or guidance on how to safely handle potentially malicious instructions embedded within the retrieved task content. - Capability inventory: The skill is capable of writing files via
plan-save.shand executing bash scripts, which could be abused if an injected instruction is followed. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or validation performed on the task data before it is processed by the AI agent.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata