x-poster
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 10, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive local directories, specifically
~/.claude/projectsand~/.claude/usage-data/session-meta. These folders contain detailed session transcripts and user interaction history. This data is read by theDailyDigest.tstool to summarize user activity for social media posts, which could potentially expose private development details if the summaries are published without review. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs dynamic command execution using
Bun.spawnin theDailyDigest.tstool to run an external script (Inference.ts). Additionally, theGenerateVisual.mdworkflow executes a script from a separate directory (~/.claude/skills/Art/Tools/Generate.ts) to create images. The skill also allows for the execution path of the inference tool to be overridden via theXPOSTER_INFERENCE_PATHenvironment variable. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
UpdateAlgorithm.mdworkflow incorporates data fetched viaWebSearchinto the agent's knowledge base. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious content in search results could influence the agent's tweet generation or scoring criteria. Mandatory evidence: 1. Ingestion:UpdateAlgorithm.md(WebSearch). 2. Boundary markers: None. 3. Capability:mcp__x-server__create_tweet. 4. Sanitization: Not mentioned. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted input from user-created files in the
INPUT/directory and automated session captures. Malicious instructions embedded in these source materials could potentially influence the agent's behavior during the content transformation and validation phases. Mandatory evidence: 1. Ingestion:BatchProcess.md(INPUT files and session captures). 2. Boundary markers: None. 3. Capability:mcp__x-server__create_tweetandBun.spawn. 4. Sanitization: No explicit content filtering mentioned.
Audit Metadata