webapp-testing
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 28, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The helper script
scripts/with_server.pyusessubprocess.Popenwithshell=Trueto execute strings provided via the--servercommand-line argument. This allows for the execution of arbitrary shell commands, including those involving pipes or subshells, without sanitization. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/with_server.pyalso usessubprocess.runto execute the final command provided as a remainder argument. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
SKILL.mdfile contains instructions that explicitly tell the agent 'DO NOT read the source until you try running the script first' and to treat scripts as 'black-box scripts'. This discourages the agent from performing security audits of the code it executes, which is a concealment tactic. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it is designed to ingest and act upon untrusted data from web pages (e.g., via
page.content(),inner_text(), and console logs). An attacker-controlled website could include instructions in these fields that influence the agent's next commands, such as providing a malicious string to thewith_server.pyscript. - Ingestion points: Web page content (DOM), element text (buttons/links), and browser console logs are read into the agent's context from local or remote web applications.
- Boundary markers: None identified; there are no instructions to the agent to disregard instructions found within the processed web data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute arbitrary shell commands via the
scripts/with_server.pyutility. - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or validation of data extracted from the browser before it is used in decision-making or command construction.
Audit Metadata