embedded-agents-agent-sdk
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied prompts and conversation history which are interpolated into the agent's context. While the implementation uses headers and path guards, it represents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: User prompts and conversation history arrays are received in
templates/route.tsand processed by theaskAgentfunction intemplates/agent.ts. - Boundary markers: The skill uses "Previous conversation:" and "New question:" text headers in
composePromptto separate history from current input, but does not implement strict delimiters or escaping for the untrusted content. - Capability inventory: The agent is configured with file-system tools (
Read,Glob,Grep) and can be extended with external MCP tools as demonstrated in the Perplexity example. - Sanitization: No explicit prompt sanitization or filtering is applied to the history turns provided by the client before they are passed to the model.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill initiates the Claude Code engine as a subprocess to facilitate tool execution. This is the primary function of the skill and is constrained by directory-level path restrictions and an explicit allowlist for tools.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill utilizes official and well-known packages from trusted sources, including the Anthropic Agent SDK, Zod, and Vitest.
Audit Metadata