transactional-email
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines a system that ingests external data from event sources (such as a database's incident or invoice tables) to trigger automated email delivery. This creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection if the content of these events is not properly sanitized before being processed or included in outbound communications.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the system from event tables like
public.incidentsvia database triggers inreferences/delivery.md. - Boundary markers: The design lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to isolate potentially untrusted event content within the email generation pipeline.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses database write permissions for outbox/receipt management (
references/delivery.md) and performs network operations via external email provider APIs (SKILL.md). - Sanitization: The skill mitigates log exposure by recording only IDs and counts, but does not specify sanitization or escaping protocols for the data being sent to recipients.
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The proposed database architecture in
references/delivery.mdutilizessecurity definerfunctions for triggers to enable restricted roles to initiate email events. Although the skill documents critical security mitigations—such as setting an emptysearch_pathand pinning functions by signature—any misconfiguration of these elevated-privilege functions could be leveraged for privilege escalation within the database environment. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill performs network operations using
fetchto interact with Postmark and Resend APIs as described inSKILL.md. These interactions are necessary for the skill's primary functionality and target well-known, reputable transactional email services.
Audit Metadata