one-flow
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 18, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the
oneCLI tool, requiring the agent to execute system commands to manage connections, discover API actions, and orchestrate workflows. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The flow engine supports dynamic execution of JavaScript code via
transformandcodestep types. - Evidence: Workflows can include JavaScript expressions in the
expressionfield oftransformsteps and full function bodies in thesourcefield ofcodesteps, which are evaluated at runtime by the flow engine (SKILL.md). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests data from external sources and processes it using powerful execution capabilities.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through API responses in
actionsteps and through local file content infile-readsteps (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: There are no instructions or built-in mechanisms described to delimit untrusted data or warn the agent about embedded instructions within retrieved data.
- Capability inventory: The workflow engine includes the ability to execute arbitrary JavaScript (
code,transform), write to the filesystem (file-write), and perform network operations (actionsteps) (SKILL.md). - Sanitization: The documentation does not mention sanitization or validation routines for data retrieved from external platforms before it is interpolated into flow logic or filesystem operations.
Audit Metadata