gen-ai-explainer
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 25, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands via the
gen-aiCLI tool. Inrender-director.md, the commandgen-ai upload-to-drive <slug>/explainer.mp4 --name "<the title>"incorporates an agent-generated title string. This pattern is vulnerable to command injection if the title contains shell metacharacters and the execution environment does not perform adequate sanitization. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides an 'auto mode' that bypasses standard human-in-the-loop approval gates. This mode is triggered by phrases such as 'yolo' or 'no checks'. While documented as a feature, it grants the agent high autonomy to spend significant amounts of user credits (estimated 1500-3000) without explicit confirmation of the intermediate creative artifacts.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection during its automated research phase.
- Ingestion points:
WebSearchandWebFetchtools are used inresearch-director.mdto retrieve content from the internet. - Boundary markers: There are no specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the fetched web data.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands through the
gen-aiCLI and perform filesystem writes to project directories. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of escaping or validation performed on the external data before it influences the script and scene generation.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
research-director.mdfile mandates the use ofWebSearchandWebFetchto gather information from various online sources to ground the video's factual claims. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill includes built-in functionality to upload local project files and generated media to a remote storage service (Google Drive) via the
gen-ai upload-to-drivecommand.
Audit Metadata