Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The scripts
scripts/search_inbox.shandscripts/search_mailbox.share vulnerable to command injection. They use double-quoted strings to pass SQL queries to thesqlite3utility. Because these strings contain shell variables like$field_condition(which incorporates user-provided search terms) and$limit, the shell will perform expansion before executing the command. An attacker-controlled search term containing backticks (e.g.,term='id') or subshells will result in arbitrary command execution on the host machine. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses the highly sensitive macOS Mail database located at
~/Library/Mail/Envelope Index. This database contains the full history of subjects, senders, and metadata for all accounts configured on the system. The skill also provides ascripts/send.shtool, creating a potential path for automated data exfiltration if the agent is compromised. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it reads raw email content and provides the agent with powerful capabilities to send, delete, or archive messages.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/read_by_id.shoutputs the full content of emails directly into the agent's context. - Boundary markers: The skill uses a minimal text-based header (
--- Content ---) which does not effectively isolate untrusted data from the agent's instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill provides tools for sending (
scripts/send.sh), deleting (scripts/delete.sh), and managing emails (scripts/archive_*.sh,scripts/mark_read.sh). - Sanitization: No sanitization is performed on email content beyond simple character length truncation.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata